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 general introduction
Legal Evidence and Proof: Past, Present, Future
Legal evidence has to do with facts (though even this basic stance has been 
questioned, in the already extensive literature on the subject). in fact, the law has 
to do with facts in so many more ways. Law itself consists of institutional facts. 
facts determine the content of law: think of Hart’s minimum content of natural 
law, based on elementary facts of human and social life. Law sets factual limits to 
human conduct, through threats of punishment and so much more, just as it creates 
possibilities for important kinds of conduct and its factual consequences, such as 
legislating and contracting. Lawful (and unlawful) conduct changes the facts of 
the world. So many more relationships of law and fact remain to be investigated.
Most important, of course, are facts determining the application of legal rules 
to parts of the living (and sometimes dead) world, or: the problem of legal evidence 
and proof. establishment of such facts, needed in order to realize the law (and 
hopefully justice and right) may go without much further saying, in any case if all 
parties and others concerned reasonably agree on them. But more than a few legal 
and other conflicts on the application of rules are fought over disputed facts, rather 
than disputed law, in courts of law and in the real world. So methods and standards 
have to be devised to settle conflicts over facts in some or other authoritative or 
even rational manner. a rather ancient but still probably well-known example of 
this is to be found in the code of Hammurabi:
if a man charge a man with sorcery, but cannot convict him, he who is charged 
with sorcery shall go to the sacred river, and he shall throw himself in the sacred 
river; if the river overcome him, his prosecutor shall take to himself his house. 
if the river show the man to be innocent and he come forth unharmed, he that 
charged him with sorcery shall be put to death. He who threw himself into the 
river shall take to himself the house of his accuser.
a rather unconventional way to establish strange facts, one might say with the 
benefit of hindsight, though a later and probably still better-known issue of evidence 
and proof offers a comparable semblance of the complete disparity of methods of 
discovery and facts to be established. Here is the story of fact-finding by King 
Solomon, once again (1 kings 3, verse 16, new king james translation):
now two women who were harlots came to the king, and stood before him. and 
one woman said, ‘o my lord, this woman and i dwell in the same house; and i 
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gave birth while she was in the house. then it happened, the third day after i had 
given birth, that this woman also gave birth. and we were together; no one was 
with us in the house, except the two of us in the house. and this woman’s son 
died in the night, because she lay on him. So she arose in the middle of the night 
and took my son from my side, while your maidservant slept, and laid him in her 
bosom, and laid her dead child in my bosom. and when i rose in the morning to 
nurse my son, there he was, dead. But when i had examined him in the morning, 
indeed, he was not my son whom i had borne.’
 then the other woman said, ‘no! But the living one is my son, and the dead 
one is your son.’ And the first woman said, ‘No! But the dead one is your son, 
and the living one is my son.’ thus they spoke before the king. and the king 
said, ‘the one says, “this is my son, who lives, and your son is the dead one”; 
and the other says, “no! But your son is the dead one, and my son is the living 
one.”’ then the king said, ‘Bring me a sword.’ So they brought a sword before 
the king. and the king said, ‘divide the living child in two, and give half to one, 
and half to the other.’
 then the woman whose son was living spoke to the king, for she yearned 
with compassion for her son; and she said, ‘o my lord, give her the living child, 
and by no means kill him!’ But the other said, ‘Let him be neither mine nor 
yours, but divide him.’ So the king answered and said, ‘Give the first woman the 
living child, and by no means kill him; she is his mother.’ and all israel heard 
of the judgment which the king had rendered; and they feared the king, for they 
saw that the wisdom of god was in him to administer justice.
However, some progress seems to have been made. reconstruction of king 
Solomon’s argumentation, or better still, justification in terms of implicit premises 
brings to light a reasonably strong connection between testimonies cunningly 
elicited and the fact to be proven. arguments referring to riverside experiments in 
order to determine sorcery seem all too enthymemetic to pass muster in terms of 
more modern standards of evidence and proof. king Solomon applied a method of 
investigation brilliantly devised to solve a seemingly intractable problem. that is, 
intractable in those days: today, a simple (or sometimes not so simple) dna test 
would do the job just as well, according to the same high standards, albeit at the 
cost of rather reduced drama.
Progress in forensic sciences and technologies has been formidable indeed. 
But human wisdom did not always keep up with it, as is probably conclusively 
proven by recent and not so recent scandals involving sentencing or even killing 
the innocent in the name of criminal law. this (and more evidential mishaps in 
application of the law) still happens in the most civilized of jurisdictions. Why?
one major reason may be the deep-seated tendency of the judiciary to regard the 
handling of matters of evidence and proof as presupposing no special knowledge 
and skills, and acting on it. of course things go wrong at times, it will be added, 
but then there is no perfect human practice anyway. Strange as this may sound, at 
least to evidence scholars, it is a deep-seated conviction, repeatedly expressed by 
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prominent court members who are probably not conversant with a rather extensive 
literature in the field of evidence and proof. Thus a prominent district court vice-
president in the netherlands, W.M. van den Bergh, expressed his conviction on 
‘the simplicity of basic facts’ as follows (as recently as 2008):
in order to decide whether the criminal defendant did commit the crime no 
special professional judges’ expertise is needed. no special knowledge or skills 
are needed in order to become convinced of a criminal defendant’s guilt, or to 
have doubts about it.
Probably not much special knowledge nor many skills are needed to comprehend 
that this kind of conviction behind convictions may be rather dangerous for 
the innocent. this is amply demonstrated by so many death row inmates in the 
United States owing their lives and liberty to non-legal people applying special 
knowledge, skills and zeal to their wrongly decided cases. just as more than a few 
victims of misadministration of criminal justice in great Britain, the netherlands 
and elsewhere were freed as a consequence of ‘laypeople’s’ unrelenting zeal on 
behalf of their cases. (derksen’s scathing and, in the end, effective public criticism 
of courts’ misuse of basic statistics in a nurse’s conviction for infant killing is a 
case in point: see also his contribution to this book.)
in line with this is legal people’s tendency to incorporate issues of fact into 
the law. indeed one important feature of legal evidence and proof is the regulation 
of legal fact-finding. Rules of procedure govern police authorities in search and 
seizure, admissibility of evidence and of witnesses, distribution of burdens of 
proof, legal standards of proof, determination of proof by authoritative bodies and 
so much more of course. this may indeed lead to legalizing or better still, legally 
formalizing issues of evidence and proof. or: as long as the rules are faithfully 
adhered to, the outcome of legal processing of evidence is taken to be equivalent to 
legally relevant certainty as to the facts of the case. a notorious expression of this 
legal attitude towards facts (or ‘facts’) is United States Supreme court member 
Scalia’s well-known dictum in Herrera v. Collins (506 US 390, 1993):
Mere factual innocence is no reason not to carry out a death sentence properly 
reached.
thus doubts about the redundancy of special expertise and skill in the determination 
of legal evidence and proof (is it really true that malice, negligence or innocence 
are plain to see?!) seem to be done away with by reference to the authority of legal 
procedure. (Scalia even seems to be in postmodern company, doubting the very 
concept of a fact independent from ‘authoritative establishment’.)
Still this is not a generally accepted standpoint, outside or even inside judiciaries. 
to limit the discussion to criminal procedure: it may be true that the great majority 
of criminal cases relate to certainty (according to whatever standards) of offender 
identification. Even then, issues of malice and negligence may not always be 
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simple. next, more than a few hard cases remain. there may be circumstantial 
evidence only, witnesses may appear not to be completely trustworthy, expert 
witnesses may contradict each other, and so on. it does not seem plausible or even 
viable to do away with such kinds of uncertainties by simply referring to standards 
of legal procedure, let alone by appealing to commonly available knowledge and 
skills as sufficient to solve such riddles.
thus questions about rational standards of evidence and proof crop up, as 
distinct from rules of procedure determining issues such as the division of burdens 
of proof and admissibility of evidence. obviously, availability of direct evidence in 
the sense of exhaustive demonstration of the facts of the case before adjudicators’ 
eyes and ears is rather exceptional. it would be hard even to think of a convincing 
example of this. in a grimly captivating story of a lawyer, herself caught in the 
machinery or machinations of criminal justice, janet Malcolm comments on this 
with the following fundamental remark (1999,  19):
Historical reconstruction in all cases gives rise to structures that are more like 
ruins than proper buildings; there is never enough solid building material and 
always too much dust.
How to clear this dust away, to a sufficient extent? What counts as dust, what is 
a sufficient extent? (Scalia probably would not mind.) Probability considerations 
plaguing so many criminal and other issues of fact set in here already. next, there 
is the different and more practical distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence. Such evidence may be available to adjudicators with or without the 
intervention of witnesses.
in any case, the absence of ‘the facts of the case themselves’ (if this is a sensible 
concept at all) raises questions on standards of evidence and rules (in a wide sense) 
governing relationships between ‘available evidence’ and ‘the facts of the case’. 
this is related to the long-standing and recently revived discussion of the ‘logic’ of 
evidence and proof, dominated for so long by the towering figures of Bentham and 
Wigmore. to further introduce this discussion it seems apposite to quote Bentham 
at some length (1827, Book i, Part 1):
By the term evidence, considered according to the most extended application 
that is ever given to it, may be, and seems in general to be, understood, any 
matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which, when presented to the 
mind, is to produce a persuasion concerning the existence of some other matter 
of fact—a persuasion either affirmative or disaffirmative of its existence.
 of the two facts thus connected with each other, the latter may, for the 
purpose of expressing the place it bears in its relation to the other, be distinguished 
by the appellation of the principal fact, or matter of fact: the other, by that of the 
evidentiary fact, or matter of fact.
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 taking the word in this sense, questions of evidence are continually 
presenting themselves to every human being, every day, and almost every 
waking hour, of his life.
…
 the impression, or something like an impression, i see in the grass—the 
marks of twisting, bending, breakage, i think i see in the leaves and branches of 
the shrubs—the smell that seems to present itself to my nostrils—do they afford 
sufficient evidence that the deer, that the enemy, I am in chase of, have passed 
this way? not polished only, but even the most savage men—not human kind 
only, but even the brute creation, have their rules—i will not say, as Montesquieu 
would have said, their laws—of evidence.
just as so many issues of evidence and proof remain the same in human life, 
at least some issues of legal evidence and proof have, of course, changed since 
the days of Bentham. Still, miscarriages of justice continue to the present day. 
We may have come a long way since Hammurabi, but king Solomon seems less 
easily surpassed. one driving force, apart from intellectual zeal, behind the recent 
revival of research into evidence and proof is the hope that (still) more rational 
rules or even principles of fact-finding, evidence and proof may be discovered 
and/or devised. two more introductory cautionary remarks are in order then.
first, and even if the issue is limited to facts relevant for application of the law, 
many different kinds of evidence may be relevant. This ranges from specific facts 
determining ‘who did what, and why’ or specific forensic facts like collar bone x-
rays determining the legally relevant age of refugees, or specific facts determining 
damage to be established by comparing two complete future courses of events (with 
and without tort), to general facts like: what are customs in specific parts of society 
determining ‘what may be reasonably expected in commercial dealings’. Studies 
in the logic of evidence and proof tend to concentrate on offender identification, 
probably the most important issue in this field indeed.
Second, this book does not aim to represent more than a small part of the 
current state of the art in studies of legal evidence and proof. thus issues of witness 
reliability, and issues of psychology in general, however important, are generally 
left out of account. the focus is on reasoning, logic, in a very broad sense. this 
may be further detailed as follows.
Three Current Approaches to the Study of Logic and Argumentation in 
Legal Evidence and Proof
Studies of argumentation and logic in factual legal inference have broadly speaking 
been of three kinds: statistical, story-based, and argument-based. first, statistical 
approaches acknowledge that evidence cannot provide watertight support for a 
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factual claim but almost always leaves some uncertainty. they then apply the 
‘standard’ theories for reasoning under uncertainty: statistics and probability theory. 
Much work in the statistical approach is not focused on general statistical models 
of legal fact-finding but instead criticizes particular uses of statistics in court cases 
(e.g. dawid 2005). those who do focus on general models sometimes advocate 
a Bayesian approach, according to which domain experts provide conditional 
probabilities on hypotheses given the available evidence, while the fact-finder 
estimates the prior probabilities on the hypotheses. the mathematics of Bayesian 
probability theory then allows the computation of the posterior probability of 
the hypotheses, given the evidence. if, for a certain hypothesis, this probability 
exceeds the proof standard, the hypothesis can be accepted. Probabilistic theories 
of evidential reasoning have been thoroughly studied by david Schum (e.g. 
1994).
Statistical methods can be very useful for investigating the relevance of 
evidence, for instance, by performing so-called sensitivity analysis, i.e., testing 
how a change in the likelihood of a statement affects that of other statements (see, 
e.g., kadane and Schum 1996). However, the statistical approach is by no means 
uncontroversial (a useful critical overview of the debate is Lempert 1986). one 
objection is that in legal cases the required numbers are usually not available, 
either because there are no reliable statistics, or because experts are unable or 
reluctant to provide reliable estimates of probabilities. another objection is that 
statistics and probability theory impose a standard of rationality that cannot be 
attained in practice, so that their application would lead to more instead of fewer 
errors. to overcome these and other limitations of statistical models, other models 
have been proposed.
Second, the story-based approach was initially proposed by the psychologists 
Bennett and feldman (1981). their main claim was not normative but empirical, 
being that the way lawyers make factual judgements is not by statistical reasoning 
but by constructing and comparing stories about what might have happened. 
Wagenaar et al. (1993) go a step further, arguing that this is in fact the only way 
for fact-finders to reason about the facts of the case, given the cognitive limitations 
of humans. their research then takes a normative twist, studying how story-based 
factual judgement may be more rational. An important point here is that specific 
stories must be ‘anchored’ in factual generalizations which may, however, be less 
than certain, so that their applicability to a case must be critically examined. the 
story-based approach has also been embraced by some artificial intelligence (AI) 
researchers, based on the idea that story-based reasoning is not unlike abductive 
reasoning and inference to the best explanation, for which elaborate ai models 
exist (josephson 2001; Poole 2001; keppens et al. 2005; thagard 2005).
a third approach takes not stories, but arguments, as the main concept. Bentham 
looms large here as well. in contemporary theory, however, Wigmore’s charting 
method of legal evidence is prominent. With this method alternative arguments 
from evidence to hypotheses can be graphically displayed and sources of doubt 
in these arguments can be revealed (e.g. Wigmore 1931). generalizations are 
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important here as well, since they are the ‘glue’ that connects the evidence with 
the hypotheses, and since their general plausibility and possible exceptions are 
important sources of doubt. Wigmore’s charting method has been extended and 
refined by the ‘New Evidence Scholars’ (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005). One study of 
legal evidential reasoning from the perspective of dialogical argumentation theory 
is Walton’s (2002). in ai and Law the argument-based approach has been founded 
on so-called non-monotonic, or defeasible logics, which were developed in ai to 
formalize reasoning with uncertain and incomplete information in cases where 
uncertainty cannot be quantified. In AI and Law one type of non-monotonic logic 
is particularly popular: argument-based logic, modelling defeasible reasoning as 
the construction and comparison of arguments and counter-arguments (e.g. verheij 
2000; Bex et al. 2003; Prakken 2004).
finally, some have studied combinations of approaches. for example, keppens 
(e.g. keppens et al. 2005) has studied combinations of probability theory and 
abduction in the context of investigation. kadane and Schum (1996) and Schum 
(2001) have reinterpreted Wigmore charts as so-called Bayesian networks. Such 
networks, developed in ai, combine probability distributions with graphical 
models of probabilistic dependencies (which may be based on commonsense 
generalizations).
although the three approaches are different in important respects, they also 
share an important feature. in all three approaches, defeasibility is prominent. 
for example, in probabilistic models new evidence may reduce the posterior 
probability of hypotheses, in story-based approaches new evidence may reduce 
the credibility of a story, and in argument-based logics new evidence may give 
rise to arguments that defeat a previously undefeated argument. in all these cases 
the deeper reason for this phenomenon is that evidence almost always leaves room 
for doubt: sources of evidence (such as witnesses) are fallible, and general world 
knowledge is uncertain and leaves room for exceptions.
defeasibility of legal evidential reasoning is related to both investigative and 
procedural aspects of legal evidence and proof. Legal reasoning about the facts 
takes place in a variety of contexts, which may be broadly divided into contexts 
of investigation and contexts of judgment. this distinction is, of course, related to 
the well-known epistemological and methodological distinction between contexts 
of discovery and contexts of justification. It was long held that these contexts 
are completely separated: how a scientist came to a certain theory was regarded 
as irrelevant for the truth of the theory. Legal logicians have long had a similar 
attitude to the justification of legal judgments: the process by which a certain 
judgment was reached was regarded as irrelevant for the quality of the judgment. 
However, developments in philosophy and ai have softened the sharp distinction 
between the two contexts. for these reasons, this book takes a broad perspective, 
studying both the investigative and the judgment phase.
relationships between phases of investigation and judgment raise interesting 
issues, such as whether both phases are governed by the same or by different 
models of inference. for instance, looking for hypotheses about the facts of a case, 
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as in the investigative phase, may require abductive models of reasoning with a 
relatively low proof standard, while deciding whether a hypothesis can be accepted 
as true involves critical adjudication with a high standard of proof. another issue 
is to what extent the soundness of an inference in the judgment phase depends on 
the quality of the preceding investigation.
a further theme relevant for reasoning about the facts of a case is the relation 
between rationality requirements and legal constraints. At first sight, since this 
book’s focus is on rational models of factual legal reasoning, it would seem that 
specific features of legal systems may be ignored. However, it will turn out that one 
stumbles quite quickly on the tension between a rational ideal and legal reality. the 
simplest example of this tension is the necessity to decide about a case even though 
perfect knowledge about what has happened is unattainable. Human imperfection 
in deciding cases necessarily implies that some offenders go free, while some 
innocent people are punished. also, evidence on which a case is decided is not 
simply given but established by rules of procedure and admissibility of evidence. 
Moreover, the inferences that can be drawn from the admissible evidence are not 
only determined by rules of rational inference but also by legal procedural rules 
on, for instance, burdens of proof and presumption.
in conclusion, studies of legal evidence and logic should not just focus on 
models of inference but should embed such models in accounts of investigation 
and different kinds of procedure.
An Overview of the Book
this book aims to cover these different issues as follows. chapter 1 offers 
brief discussion of why legal evidence and proof seems desirable at all, or even 
imperative. chapters 2 and 3 represent statistical approaches in a broad sense. 
Story-based discussion is to be found in chapters 4 to 6; chapters 7 and 8 compare 
story-based with argument-based accounts. the remaining three chapters are 
firmly on argumentative grounds. Summaries of the chapters may clarify this:
1. Hendrik Kaptein (Leiden University) discusses the basic question why legal 
evidence and proof are needed at all. reasons against singling out offenders are 
expounded. also, practical obstacles to the reliable establishment of evidence and 
proof pass muster. this leads to questions concerning the very concept of proof, 
presumably linking present evidence with past (or future) events. Brief discussion 
of (Benthamite) ideals seems to lead inexorably to the conclusion that proof of past 
events is impossible in principle. Lawyers’ standard answer to such theoretical 
scepticism refers to proceduralism: there need be no such thing as historical truth 
in adjudication and conflict resolution in general, as ‘legal truth on the facts of the 
matter’ is exhaustively determined by the outcome of reasonable legal procedures. 
this ‘practical solution’ is argued to be deeply implausible in principle, not just 
because it may lead to legal establishment of fact at odds with historical reality. 
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one suggestion would be to limit troublesome issues of evidence and proof to 
determination of harm done (in a wide sense), leaving issues of authorship alone. 
thus problems of evidence and proof may be ‘halved’. against this is put forward 
that individual liability is a basic presupposition of personal identity and thus of 
meaningful human relationships. or: it is argued that there can be no humanly 
feasible society without ascription of individual liability and its consequences. 
So it is contended that there still is an issue of evidence and proof concerning 
offenders, not just concerning harm done. Legal forms and limits of this are 
discussed, including implications for standards of evidence and proof.
2. Ton Derksen (University of nijmegen) and Monica Meijsing (University of 
tilburg) discuss a notorious criminal case from the netherlands. nurse Lucia de 
B. was convicted of seven murders and three attempted murders with the penalty 
of life imprisonment. yet there was little evidence apart from the fact that at the 
hospital where it all started, quite a number of resuscitations happened during the 
nurse’s shifts. then, after one more resuscitation, it was felt that that all this could 
not be just a coincidence. Very early in the process a quantification was given to 
the uneasy feeling that proportionally there were too many resuscitations during 
the nurse’s shifts. the probability that such a coincidence could have happened by 
mere accident was calculated by one expert as 1 in 342,000,000. With that number 
out in the open, the general notion was that what had happened could not be just 
an accident. The nurse definitely had to be a serial killer, even in the absence of 
any further evidence. it is argued that this idea was in fact the driving force in the 
whole judicial process. it coloured everybody’s perception, including that of the 
prosecution and the courts. and it fabricated a whole series of incriminating facts 
which inexorably led to the completely unwarranted conclusion against Lucia de 
B. important general lessons may be learned from this. throughout the process 
three dangerous reasoning instincts may be seen at work: (1) the Small chance 
instinct (2) the no Smoke without fire instinct, and (3) human inclination to pay 
little attention to base rates (in non-everyday situations).
3. Ton Broeders (University of Maastricht and Leiden University) discusses 
rational and probabilistic models of forensic decision-making in individuation 
problems. in such problems a forensic scientist is confronted with a trace (for 
example, a fingerprint, some handwriting, a DNA sample, or a bullet) and has to 
determine its source (a specific person, a specific firearm). Traditional forensic 
approaches are criticized for requiring that identification and elimination should 
be categorical and that therefore the reasoning involved should be deductive. 
against this it is claimed that this kind of reasoning has to be inductive, since, 
when determining the source of a trace, it is practically impossible to compare the 
source with the entire population of all potential sources. therefore probabilistic 
assessments are inevitable. accordingly, a Bayesian model of factual judgement 
is proposed: forensic experts should provide conditional probabilities on the 
relevance of evidence to certain hypotheses, while the fact-finder should estimate 
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the prior probabilities of these hypotheses and combine them with the expert’s 
conditional ones to calculate the impact of new evidence on the hypotheses’ 
posterior probability. it is also argued that in order to avoid misunderstandings 
it is essential that the expert report his findings to the adjudicator in a rationally 
correct format. Traditional conclusion formats are argued to be logically flawed 
and misleading. a more plausible conclusion format is suggested.
4. Floris Bex (University of groningen) focuses on the story-based approach to 
reasoning about the facts of a case. after a discussion of previous work on the 
role of stories in legal evidential reasoning, the notion of story schemes as a tool 
to assess story plausibility is developed. Stories are argued to be plausible if their 
facts fit story schemes. A story scheme is a description of typical event structures, 
such as the typical facts of a robbery or, more generally, an intentional crime. it 
is noted that story schemes can be more or less abstract and he emphasizes that it 
is important to match a story with the most specific available story scheme. For 
instance, a robbery story’s plausibility is best established using a story scheme for 
robberies, and less so by using a story scheme for intentional crimes. this account 
of story schemes is also used to explicate the role of causal generalizations that 
connect causally related facts in a story, and it is noted how story schemes have 
different uses, e.g., for story analysis (in decision-making), hypothesis generation 
(in investigation) and for building persuasive stories (in pleading).
5. Marijke Malsch (netherlands institute for the Study of crime and Law 
enforcement, nScr) and Ian Freckelton (Monash University, Melbourne) 
discuss two broad types of evidence evaluation within criminal cases. one of them 
concerns a ‘holistic’ way of looking at the various items of evidence and coming 
to conclusions about how convincing they are in terms of their probative value. 
the use of stories, comparing different accounts of what happened, and looking 
at events as a whole, are central to this model. the other way in which evidence is 
evaluated is atomistic, whereby each item of evidence is weighed and scrutinized 
independently from the other evidence. it represents, in principle, a bottom-up 
way of coming to conclusions regarding what happened in a case. advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach are discussed. attention is paid to two archetypes 
of legal systems: the adversarial and the inquisitorial. taking the netherlands and 
australia as examples of the two types of legal systems, this chapter examines 
those characteristics that can be expected to contribute to a preference for either 
a holistic way or an atomistic way of evaluating evidence. an answer is sought to 
the question, which type of legal system would prefer to use one of the modes of 
evidence evaluation over the other. Some legal systems may be more inclined to 
a holistic approach than others, and vice versa. Some cautious recommendations 
are made.
6. Amalia Amaya (formerly Harvard University, now national autonomous 
University of Mexico) discusses the combination of story-based approaches 
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with ai and cognitive science models of inference to the best explanation. it is 
argued that most arguments about facts in law are instances of ‘inference to the 
best explanation’, that is, patterns of inference whereby explanatory hypotheses 
are formed and evaluated. a coherentist interpretation of inference to the best 
explanation is offered, according to which reasoning about facts in law involves 
first the generation of several plausible explanations of the evidence at trial and 
then the selection, from among them, of the one that is best according to a test of 
explanatory coherence. it is shown how the explanationist model of legal proof 
proposed would deal with the o.j. Simpson case. next, there is discussion of a 
major criticism against a model of inference to the best explanation in law, namely, 
the objection from the bad lot, which says that the best available explanation might 
still be a bad one. against this it is noted that the investigation phase in which the 
explanations are constructed is governed by principles of epistemic responsibility 
and that respecting these principles increases the chance that the best explanation 
available is rationally acceptable.
7. Bart Verheij and Floris Bex (University of groningen) contribute one more 
piece of the puzzle as to how the story-based and argument-based approaches 
are related. the main result of this chapter is a set of argumentation schemes, 
reconstructing anchored narratives theory. Such schemes are kinds of semi-formal 
analogues of the rules of inference of logic. An argumentation scheme specifies 
conditions that can support a conclusion and possibly also exceptions that can 
apply and conditions of use for the scheme. the central argumentation scheme 
of the set makes explicit how a story can be accepted as true according to the 
anchored narratives theory: the story must be good and the story must be well 
anchored. an important exception to the rule that good, well anchored stories can 
be accepted as true is the availability of another good story, with equally good 
or perhaps even better anchoring. thus the argumentation schemes developed in 
the chapter lead to some refinements and clarifications of the anchored narratives 
theory. in particular, it is explained how accepting a story about the facts of a 
crime can depend recursively on stories about pieces of evidence. it is proposed 
that the acceptance of the truth of a story about a piece of evidence should be 
treated in the same way as the acceptance of the truth of a story about the crime 
facts, but using different measures of the plausibility of such stories (in the form 
of different story structures).
8. Hendrik Kaptein discusses the often belittled but in fact fundamental conflict 
between anomism (evidence and proof are to be established by any means, as long 
as they conform to relevant facts) and proceduralism (legally relevant facts are to 
be established by authoritative procedure). anomism is shown to be related to strict 
distinctions between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, related in 
their turn to ideals of monotonic reasoning. Proceduralism, on the other hand, 
implies the dependence of justification on procedure, with the attendant relevance 
of defeasible reasoning. Several objections against anomism are discussed, ranging 
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from the problem of the argumentum ad ignorantiam and doubtful objectivist 
ontological and epistemological presuppositions to its practical impossibility. 
At first sight this would seem to reinstate proceduralism and its basic idea of 
constructed ‘reality’. Still, such ‘pure’ proceduralism is shown to come down to 
giving up the idea of reasonable conflict resolution as such. What is left to be done, 
then, is the devising of rational procedures for unearthing the truth of the matter, 
or: proceduralism is one important (heuristic) tool in reconstructing reality.
9. Henry Prakken (University of groningen and Utrecht University) and Giovanni 
Sartor (cirSfid, University of Bologna and european University institute, 
florence) continue with the argumentation approach. the starting point is the 
claim that logics for defeasible argumentation provide the means to logically 
characterize the difference between several kinds of proof burdens, but only if 
they are embedded in a dynamic setting that captures the various stages of a legal 
proceeding. it is also argued that ‘standard’ argumentation logics for ai must be 
adapted in order to model shifts in burdens of proof. thus this analysis illustrates 
in two ways that logics cannot be simply imposed on the law but that features of 
legal systems must be taken into account. first there is the claim that the burden of 
persuasion, which legally is the burden to prove a statement to a specified degree 
(the standard of proof), with the penalty of losing on the issue, can be verified 
by applying an argumentation logic to the evidence available at the final stage of 
a proceeding. then a precise distinction is made between two burdens that are 
sometimes confused, namely the burden of production and the tactical burden. in 
this analysis, the tactical burden of proof is automatically induced by the defeasible 
nature of the reasoning. the burden of production, by contrast, concerns the legal 
question of whether an issue can be submitted to trial or must be decided as a 
matter of law against the one who fails to produce any evidence. finally the issue 
is raised as to what extent this account can be generalized to statistical and story-
based approaches.
10. Burkhard Schafer (University of edinburgh School of Law, joseph Bell centre) 
aims at a tentative exploration of a legal theory of rational argumentation, that is a 
theory that takes the rules of legal procedure as a starting point and aims to describe 
the way in which they function in a legal argument. the relationship between 
rational and legal procedural principles of evidentiary reasoning is addressed, 
taking kaptein’s distinction between anomism and proceduralism (see chapter 
8) as a starting point. it is claimed that when these clash, it is not always the law 
that is at fault. indeed it is argued that rational inquiry in the natural sciences may 
not be the paradigm of fact-finding in the law. Typically, legal rational values may 
be at least as important. Legal-procedural rules should not be seen as contingent 
extra-rational add-ons to rational models, merely meant to promote extra-rational 
legal values such as fairness and due process. instead it is argued that several 
such constraints enhance rational truth seeking, since they restore the epistemic 
asymmetry that sets legal trial apart from scientific debate. The difference shows 
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itself most clearly in criminal trials, where the defendant has privileged access 
to the truth, while the prosecution has privileged access to the means of proof. 
Legal procedure aims at restoring the epistemic symmetry between the parties by, 
for instance, rules on burdens of proof and pre-trial disclosure rules. Because of 
the epistemic asymmetry of legal procedure, it is also argued that legal evidential 
reasoning is not about what is true but about what can be proven to be true. against 
Prakken and Sartor, in this book and elsewhere, it is put forward that this can be 
modelled as deductive instead of defeasible inference since the question ‘what has 
been proven’ is not addressed until the end of a proceeding, at which point no new 
evidence can be introduced, which excludes any further defeat.
References
anderson, t.j., Schum, d.a. and twining, W.L. (2005), Analysis of Evidence, 2nd 
edition (cambridge: cambridge University Press).
Bennett, W.L. and feldman, M.S. (1981), Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: 
Justice and Judgment in American Culture (London: Methuen-tavistock).
Bentham, j. (1827), Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English 
Practice, in Bowring and Mill (eds).
Bergh, W.M. van den (2008), ‘Het oordeel is aan de rechter én jury’ (‘Both judge 
and jury are to judge’), NRC.NEXT, 19.
Bex, f.j., Prakken, H., reed, c. and Walton, d.n. (2003), ‘towards a formal account 
of reasoning about evidence: argumentation schemes and generalisations’, 
Artificial Intelligence and Law 11, 125–65.
Bowring, j. and Mill, j. (eds) (1843), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 6 onwards 
(edinburgh: William tait).
dawid, a.P. (2005), ‘Probability and Statistics in the Law’, in ghahramani and 
cowell (eds).
ghahramani, Z. and cowell, r.g. (eds) (2005), Proceedings of the Tenth 
International Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (Barbados: 
aiStatS).
josephson, j.r. (2001), ‘on the proof dynamics of inference to the best explanation’, 
Cardozo Law Review 22, 1621–43.
kadane, j.B. and Schum, d.a. (1996), A Probabilistic Analysis of the Sacco and 
Vanzetti Evidence (new york: john Wiley and Sons, inc.).
keppens, j., Shen, Q. and Schafer, B. (2005), ‘Probabilistic abductive computation 
of evidence collection Strategies in crime investigation’, Proceedings of the 
Tenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (new york: 
acM Press), pp. 215–24.
koppen, P.j. van and roos, n.H.M. (eds) (2000), Rationality, Information 
and Progress in Law and Psychology: Liber Amoricum Hans F. Crombag 
(Maastricht: Metajuridica Publications).
kaptein book.indb   13 05/12/2008   09:36:28
Legal Evidence and Proof14
Lempert, r. (1986), ‘the new evidence scholarship: analyzing the process of 
proof’, Boston University Law Review 66, 439–77.
Malcolm, j. (1999), The Crime of Sheila McCough (new york: Borzoi Books, 
alfred a. knopf, inc.).
Poole, d.L. (2001), ‘Logical argumentation, abduction and Bayesian decision 
theory: a Bayesian approach to logical arguments and its application to legal 
evidential reasoning’, Cardozo Law Review 22, 1733–45.
Prakken, H. (2004), ‘analysing reasoning about evidence with formal models of 
argumentation’, Law, Probability and Risk 3, 33–50.
Schum, d.a. (1994), The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning 
(new york: john Wiley and Sons).
–––– (2001), ‘alternative views of argument construction from a mass of evidence’, 
Cardozo Law Review 22, 1461–1502.
thagard, P. (2005), ‘testimony, credibility and explanatory coherence’, Erkenntnis, 
63, 295–316.
verheij, B. (2000), ‘dialectical argumentation as a Heuristic for courtroom 
decision-making’, in van koppen and roos (eds).
Wagenaar, W.a., koppen, P.j. van and crombag, H. (1993), Anchored Narratives: 
The Psychology of Criminal Evidence (new york: St. Martin’s Press).
Walton, d.n. (2002), Legal Argumentation and Evidence (University Park, Pa: 
Pennsylvania State University Press).
Wigmore, j.H. (1931), The Principles of Judicial Proof, 2nd edition (Boston: 
Little, Brown & company).
kaptein book.indb   14 05/12/2008   09:36:28
